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How to Hold on to Hierarchy:
Russia and the Near Abroad
by Andrew Jensen

Introduction

The smoldering wreckage of a commercial airliner in an Eastern Ukraine farm
field signified so much more than just hundreds of innocent deaths; the downing
was a bloody symbol of just how far Ukraine had fallen. Peace agreements between
the rebels and government forged in Minsk in September 2014 and February 2015
failed to stamp out the persistent violence. Not simply a civil war, the rebels had been
trained, armed, and assisted by the Russian military. While Russia flatly denied its
contribution of men and munitions, few in the West believed the claims. Despite sev
eral rounds of sanctions by the EU and the U.S., rockets and bullets continued to take
the lives of soldiers and civilians (CSIS 2015). How could peaceful protests against
an unpopular president have caused this? Why has Russia persisted in this course
of action? Considering the precipitous decline of the domestic economy exacerbated
by the sanctions, Russia seems to be paying a high cost for its actions. In addition,
encouraging instability on its border seems contrary to Moscow's security interest. So
what is the Kremlin gaining with its war in Ukraine?
Of course, the conflict extends well beyond the borders of the Ukraine. The
Ukrainian war must be understood in the larger context of Russian and European
foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. One major consequence of the crisis was
the Russian annexation of Crimea in the summer of 2014. This unauthorized seizure
of territory threatens the international system wherein nation-states possess ultimate
sovereignty over their borders (Lake 8-9). However, it appears unlikely that Russia
will return control of the peninsula back to Ukraine despite the loss of international
prestige and the heavy sanctions imposed by the EU and United States. Instead, Mos
cow has maintained the threat of further annexation and military involvement. East3
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em European nations, particularly former Soviet nations, rightly fear they may be
the next victims of Russian aggression (Oliker et al., 2009, 110). Thus, the Ukrainian
conflict is both a European conflict and a threat to the international system. The war
between sovereign states and territories seeking self-determination includes not only
Kiev and Donetsk but also Chisinau, Transnistria, Tbilisi, and South Ossetia.
In Ukraine, Russia is pursuing a familiar strategy to retain control of its former
subordinate, while blunting perceived Western encroachment. Under the doctrine of
the Near Abroad, as first laid out by Boris Yeltsin, Russia has attempted to construct
and maintain hierarchal relationships with its neighbors. Putin has intensified this
policy while seeking to "regain predominant influence in the Baltic states and Eastern Europe, as well as over Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and the rest of what Russians
call their 'Near Abroad'" (Kagan 2008). Viewed this way, the Ukrainian conflict is no
aberration but rather a dramatic manifestation of the coercive force used to compel
subordinate states to abide by the terms of explicit or implicit hierarchal contracts.
In fact, the specific tactic used against Ukraine (creating breakaway provinces by
encouraging domestic divisions and giving extensive military assistance to the opposition) has been used by Moscow on various occasions to preempt its subordinates
from inking deals with Western institutions. The 2008 war with Georgia over South
Ossetia and Abkhazia and the conflict in Moldova over Transnistria both bear striking
resemblances to the current violence in Donetsk.
This paper will carefully evaluate the effectiveness of David Lake's theory of
hierarchy in international relations in explaining these conflicts. It will establish the
commonalities between the current conflict in Ukraine, the 2008 war in Georgia, and
the Transnistria question in Moldova. In each case, it will determine whether a legitimate contract existed between Russia and the country in question prior to military
intervention, whether the nation was attempting to violate the terms of that contract,
and whether the military action prevented or attempted to prevent the country from
leaving the contract with Russia.

Theory
David Lake's theory of hierarchy is primarily a challenge to the foundational
idea of anarchy that forms the basis of the Westphalian international system (Lake
3-4). Rather than nations existing as entities of equal legitimacy and authority, a hierarchal view proposes that bilateral relations are often unequal and that this inequality is sometimes legitimized by the consent of both parties. Adapting realism, this
hierarchy theory sees "authority as a form of international power, coequal with and
perhaps even more important than coercion" (Lake XI). Subordinates grant dominant
states some of their sovereignty in either economic or security affairs. The subordinate
state may hope to gain economic stability, as in the case of dollarization in Panama
and Zimbabwe, or security such as in the case of Western Europe during the Cold
War (52-6). In return, the dominant nation gains additional prestige by imposing and
protecting both domestic and foreign interests (8-9). Although the costs of establish4
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ing and maintaining these relationships can often be high for dominant nations, their
existence suggests that dominant states find the costs worth the reward.
As opposed to realism, the hierarchy theory does not interpret Russia's aggressions in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus as coercion. Rather than military involvement in an equal partner against its will, hierarchy theorizes that these wars are a
form of discipline. Discipline, unlike coercion, carries with it legitimacy from the
implicit agreement between the nations and, like coercion, can be exhibited in many
forms. It is important to recognize that the subordinate rarely welcomes discipline
and will likely resist it. The discipline and, by extension, the relationship can continue
to have legitimacy if the community to which these nations belong also approves.
This community may be as large as the UN or as small as a few neighboring states,
but regardless of the size of the community, discipline is legitimized by international
acceptance. Furthermore, it is crucial to note that military intervention is only one of
the many forms of discipline (Lake 13).
To evaluate the effectiveness of the hierarchy theory in explaining Russia's wars,
a few factors must be determined. First, a hierarchal relationship must have existed
prior to the beginning of the disciplinary action. Thus, Russia must have assumed
some authority or decision-making power over economic or security concerns within
the subordinate country. This assumption of sovereignty must result in some demonstrable benefit for each country. Ideally, a formal agreement or treaty will have formalized this special relationship. Meeting these requirements will indicate that a
hierarchal relationship existed prior to Russia's military interventions.
Second, in order for intervention to be identified as discipline, the subordinate
must have attempted to violate the implicit or explicit terms of the authoritative
agreement with the dominant state. In these specific cases, it appears that the subordinate nations attempted to replace Russia (or Russian-dominated international organizations, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States) as the dominant nation
with another nation or organization of nations, specifically the EU or NATO (Donaldson 2000; Alison 2013, 121-22). The subordinate state will likely have attempted
to replace some of the sovereignty previously enjoyed by Russia with respect to economic or security policy. Likely this means bilateral agreements with either a Western
body that moves the subordinate nation closer to economic integration with the EU or
security cooperation with NATO. In addition to public steps toward Western integration, the subordinate state may withdraw itself from prior agreements with Russia,
limiting Russia's control of sovereignty (Olik.er et al., 106--08).
Next, Russia must have taken concrete and punitive steps in order to punish
disobedience. These actions must have the express purpose of punishing the subordinate nation by constricting important economic activity or by threatening the
nation's national security, with the hope that the actions will prevent the shift of
the subordinate nation to the influence of another dominant power (Lake 112-13).
This strategy is effective in preventing EU accession of subordinate countries, because
5
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it "is not willing to import possible security conflicts which may arise due to contested borders or territorial disputes between new member states and their eastern
neighbours" (Arnswald 2000, 135). Unfortunately, Russia's military and political
leaders are unlikely to describe the genuine geopolitical reasons for its action. While
difficult to precisely measure the motivations of the leaders of Russia in choosing
military intervention due to a lack of transparency, it can be assumed that military
action taken immediately after a major alignment shift by the subordinate was caused
by a threat to the hierarchal relationship. Thus, establishing a timeline of events may
approximate a causal chain leading to the beginning of war.
Finally, having established that a hierarchal relationship existed and that disciplinary action was taken with the aim of maintaining the status quo of the relationship, the results of the intervention will be evaluated. Understanding whether
military action contributes to the success of Russia's neighborhood policy in Eurasia
may give insight to how Moscow intends to proceed in coming decades. If an aggressive geopolitical policy allows Russia to prevent Western hierarchal dominance, then
it is likely that Putin and his successors will continue to resist integration and continue in a course of belligerence. On the other hand, the general failure of the policy
to prevent realignment does not bode well for continuing violence and intimidation. The policy will be considered successful if the subordinate was frustrated in its
attempt to draw closer to the West.
If the conflicts in Transnistria, Ukraine, or Georgia fail to meet the criteria of a
hierarchal relationship with Moscow as the dominant state, the attempted violation of
the terms of this contract by the subordinate state, and discipline by Russia intended
to maintain hierarchy, then the causal link cannot hold and hierarchy theory will lack
internal validity. For instance, if Russia intervened militarily when the subordinate
had not attempted a shift to the West by seeking membership in Western institutions
or if the subordinate state had never entered into any semblance of an agreement with
Russia, the theory would not apply.

Case Selection
Russia has or has attempted to have hierarchal relationships with many of its
neighbors, especially with former members of the USSR (Oliker et al., 93-4). The Near
Abroad policy pursued so aggressively by Moscow is received in degrees among the
intended subordinate states. Some, particularly the Baltic States and the former Warsaw Pact members, fully integrated with the West after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union; as they are current members of the EU and NATO, Russian military intervention appears unlikely (Allison 2013, 18-183). Thus, nations that rapidly integrated
with the West are poor candidates to examine Russian influence. Other nations,
such as Armenia and Belarus, have consistently followed and accepted Russian
leadership and domination (Oliker et al., 93-9). They act in accordance with Moscow's wishes and are, therefore, poor candidates to examine hierarchical discipline.
Nations that have attempted to integrate with the West against Moscow's wishes
6
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are the best candidates to study. "Neighborhood wars" in Nagoro-Karabakh and
Chechnya will not be considered despite Russian involvement, because they were
domestic in nature and were not conducted in order to escape Russian dominance
(Croissant 1998; Zurcher 2007, 70, 157). The first is a conflict primarily between two
Russian subordinates and the second is domestic in nature and was not conducted
against a subordinate.
This paper will study three cases to evaluate how well the hierarchy theory
explains Russian intervention. The first is the Moldovan conflict in Transnistria (also
Trans-dniestr) beginning in 1992. The second case is the 2008 war in Georgia over the
provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. While not the first war over these provinces
since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this conflict is distinguished by the size of
the Russian invasion as well as the explicit anti-Western motivations (Zurcher 97--8).
Finally, the war in Eastern Ukraine will be evaluated to the extent possible given the
recent nature of the violence.

Moldova
Moldova is a nation between nations. Formerly known as Bessarabia, it was
annexed by the USSR in 1944 after the Red Army displaced Romanian troops. Shortly
thereafter, the Moldovan SSR was created from the Romanian Bessarabia and several
other Russian and Ukrainian counties (Roper in Bahcheli, Bartmann, and Srebrnik
2004, 103--04), thus, diluting the Romanian majority in culture and language. As a
part of Bessarabia, many Moldovans feel pulled inexorably toward Romania (Dima
157). Their influence was countered by the politically favored Russian minority that
benefited from the Russian language and a strong relationship with Moscow. These
two competing views of the ethnic and cultural foundation of Moldova provided a
foundation for the future conflict in Transnistria (Roper in Bahcheli, Bartmann, and
Srebrnik 2004, 102--03).
Like most SSRs, Moldova moved toward independence and democracy in the
late 80s as the formation of informal discussion groups led to formal political parties. The Christian Democratic Popular Front (FPCD) advocated democracy and
a return to the Romanian language and culture and, along with its allies, won 66
percent of the vote in the last Supreme Soviet election in 1990 (Roper in Bahcheli,
Bartmann, and Srebrnik 107). The year before, Moldovan (a variant of Romanian)
was declared to be the official language of the republic, replacing Russian, which
had served as the unofficial language (Dima 158). During this time of political
upheaval, the larger implications of the resurgence in Romanian identity were
expressed by Iurie Rosca, leader of the FPCD parliamentary bloc, when he stated,
"Moldova will unify with Romania-it is inevitable. We need time for Russia to
lose power in Moldova. People do not remember what it is like to be part of Romania" (Roper in Bahcheli, Bartmann, and Srebrnik 107). Moldova's new government
made independence official in August 1991 and pursued a policy of reunification
with Romania.
7

SIGMA

The revival of old identities threatened Russians in Moscow and Moldova alike.
In Transnistria, which had never been part of Bessarabia or Romania, the majority were
Russian, Ukrainian, or Bulgarian and feared the Moldovan speaking majority that
had replaced them as the political elite. Almost immediately following the election of
the FPCD, elites in Tiraspol and other cities of Transnistria refused to recognize the
new government. A referendum in January 1990 registered overwhelming support for
territorial autonomy, and in September, the Transnistria Moldovan SSR was formed.
Following Moldovan independence in August, Transnistria formerly declared independence on the second of September and began to prepare for the inevitable military
conflict (Roper in Bahcheli, Bartmann, and Srebrnik 106--08).
Boris Yeltsin's newly endorsed policy regarding the Near Abroad compounded
the domestic issues of ethnic and linguistic identity (Donaldson 2000). Of this policy,
Nicolas Dima stated, "The initial post-Soviet doctrine, the Near Abroad, referred to
vital interests in the former Soviet republics and claimed Moscow's right to intervene
throughout this region.... Large amounts of money were spent and great efforts
were made to keep Moldova under Russian control" (Dima 2001, 158). The conflict
between Romanians and Russians became a proxy test of the hierarchal relationship
of the former SSRs as a whole. David Lake wrote that
Like rules within countries, dominant states will, therefore, be very likely to punish and make an example out of any subordinate that renounces their authority,
not only in an effort to regain their dominance over that individual (or set of individuals), but also to deter further challenges by others ... The failure to stand up
to defiance-or worse, to condone it, even implicitly-threatens the collective's
agreement on the rights of the ruler and their individual duties. (Lake 114)

As a part of the Soviet Union, Chisinau had previously taken political and economic direction from Moscow; furthermore, reunification with Romania presented a
greater threat to continued Russian domination among its former republics than mere
independence. Russia exercised considerable sovereignty in the Moldovan economy
and kept nearly 70,000 soldiers stationed in Moldova as a part of the 14th Army. Garrisoned in Transnistria, the army remained as the Soviet Union dissolved and was
transferred to the control of OS (Roper in Bahcheli, Bartmann, and Srebrnik 108).
Though Moscow relinquished nominal control of Moldova, conservatives in the government wished to preserve the status quo of Russian domination. The army allowed
these conservatives to exert a massive influence on the conflict and ensured the sovereignty of Moldova remained an open question.
As Transnistria prepared for the inevitable Moldovan response to its separatist actions in late 1991 and early 1992, the new government (including the Russian
military leadership) appointed the commanding 14th Army general to the position of
defense minister. In March, Moldova declared a state of emergency and began an
attempt to disarm the paramilitary groups in the breakaway region. Violence erupted
immediately and did not subside until June when the 14th Army took control of the
8
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last police station loyal to the Moldovan government. Recognizing their overwhelming disadvantage in men and material, Moldova signed a ceasefire agreement with
Russia and Transnistria in July. The war ended leaving more than a thousand dead and
immeasurable damage to the national psyche (Roper in Bahcheli, Bartmann, and Srebrnik 109, Kosienkowski and Schreiber 2012, 267). Agreements signed in 1994 and 19%
included guarantees of noninterference by Moldova in Transnistria and provisions for
peacekeepers (Roper in Bahcheli, Bartmann, and Srebrnik 112). In addition, Moscow
currently stations soldiers in Moldova, thereby maintaining security hierarchy.
The political consequences of the conflict have dramatically altered the course
of Moldova, preventing the Popular Front's intended reunification with Romania in
at least two ways. The FPCD, and by extension the policy of reunification, fell out of
favor with the public who blamed the party for hawkish rhetoric that incited the
war. By 1994, it lost its absolute majority to the Democratic Agrarian Party (PDA)
thus indicating that "only a small minority of the Moldovan population embraced the
pro-Romanian, anti-state position of the FPCD" (Roper in Bahcheli, Bartmann, and
Srebrnik.111). By this time, the idea of Moldovan statehood had become entrenched
within the public, while support for reunification had evaporated. In addition, the
unresolved issue of Transnistria made Moldova an unattractive candidate for annexation by Romania. For their part, the Romanians were not eager for additional conflict
with Russia or further impediments to their goal of unification with Europe (Kosienkowski and Schreiber, 159--60).
Of course, even if Moldova could have joined Romania, the lack of authority over
its claimed borders created an insurmountable obstacle, the EU is hesitant to accept
a member without sovereignty over its borders (Arnswald 153). The EU leadership
considers Transnistria a "deeply criminalized territory and source of festering soft
security challenges" (Allison, Light, and White 2006, 86-7). For this reason, the EU
will not offer Moldova full membership fearing that accession would lead to the similar
results within Cyprus, which the EU misguidedly hoped would reunify upon receiving membership in 2004 (Bahcheli in Bahcheli, Bartmann, and Srebrnik. 2004, 175-78).
Having a member nation with sovereignty limited by separatist factions challenges
the extent of the sovereignty of the EU: How could the EU claim sovereignty over
territory its member-state does not control? The Cyprus experience soured the EU's
willingness to consider membership for nations with unresolved sovereignty, including Moldova.
Despite these challenges, Moldova desperately desires the economic incentives
and market access that accompany membership in the EU (Munteanu 2013). Since its
first agreement in 1994, Moldova has signed a series of treaties and bilateral agreements signaling its desire to join the EU. The EU has attempted to engage Moldova
and has included it in the Polish-led Eastern Partnership. Russia has responded with
strong disciplinary tactics. For example, in 2006, Russia embargoed Moldovan wine.
In 2013, Russia placed an embargo on Moldovan produce as Moldova considered
9
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signing an Association Agreement (AA) with the EU, an important step to accession.
Ironically, these sanctions forced Moldova to expand trade with the EU and improve
the quality of its products, thus, reducing Moldovan dependence on Russian markets
(Kosienkowski and Schreiber 2012, 185).
Unlike the EU, Russia has been resistant to resolutions that freeze the status of
Transnistria and has been adamantly against Moldovan accession to NATO. Moscow
fears that reunification will reduce its leverage in Moldova: "The Russian government, for example, might not accept willingly or gracefully the settlement of conflicts
that have given Russia leverage with its neighbors. Russia's initial reaction to the
notion of an EU-led peace support operation in Moldova was barely lukewarm" (Lynch
2004, 126-27). In addition, Moscow feared the larger implications of NA10 expansion.
"Russian officials have set themselves against 'NATO's mandate being extend to the
Black Sea through an expansion of its Active Endeavour naval operation in 2006 ...
They look warily at Moldova's proposal in June 2005 for a shift from PfP cooperation to the deeper relationship represented by an Individual Partner Plan (IPAP) and
resent President Voronin' s request for NA10 political support to achieve withdrawal of
Russian troops from Moldova" (Allison, Light, and White 2006, 120-21).
No matter how close Moldova draws to the West, it will be denied entrance
into the most important European organizations as long as Transnistria claims sovereignty. Furthermore, Russia demands constitutional neutrality and promises it
will not join NA10 as preconditions for the return of an autonomous Transnistria
(Kosienkowski and Schreiber, 192). Although Moldova desires to leave the Russian
sphere of influence and join Romania (its sister state) as a member of the EU, Russian military leverage, along with near-total dependence on Gazprom gas, allows
Russia to dictate and limit Moldovan foreign policy. Russia still sees Moldova as its
subordinate and continues to search for ways to prevent Moldova from ending their
hierarchal relationship.

Georgia
The August War, as the 2008 invasion of Georgia by Russia came to be known,
is strikingly similar to the conflict in Transnistria. It began with attempts to defend
an ethnic minority from the supposed abuses of their current nation and ended in
decisive victory for Moscow. Perhaps most importantly, it prevented the accession of
the invaded state to NA10 and the EU. However, Georgia surpasses Moldova in the
scale and duration of the conflict as well as international intention. Its history reads
like a classic Greek tragedy: Georgia, the protagonist, began a noble quest to Westernize and could not complete the initiative, not because of a lack of will but due to its
unfortunate location between Russia and the West.
Georgia joined the Soviet Union in 1921 after a brief experiment with democracy.
The homeland of Joseph Stalin, Georgia prospered and became the wealthiest SSR. As
the winds of independence swept across Eastern Europe, Georgian elites demanded
independence and democracy and, in 1991, achieved both. Like in Moldova, the
10
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euphoria of "Georgia for the Georgians" caused non-Georgian ethnic groups to fear
domination (Cornell and Starr 2009, 16--8). The provinces of South Ossetia, Adjara,
and Abkhazia called for autonomy. The brash new government pushed against these
calls and in 1992 invaded Abkhazia killing thousands. Russian and Chechen soldiers
poured across the border and pushed Georgian troops back. The initial humiliation of
this defeat was compounded by the terms of the peace agreement, which mandated
that Georgia join the OS and the Collective Security Treaty, Russia's new answer to
NATO. In addition, four Russian bases opened on Georgian soil and Russian peacekeepers patrolled autonomous South Ossetia and Abkhazia (22-7, 35).
This first, smaller, conflict established Russia's domination over Georgian
security. Russia acted boldly, twice attempting to murder President Edward Shevardnadze. Georgia was furious about Russia's control, which was formalized and
legitimized through the various agreements that Georgia had been forced to sign.
In the late 90s, while Moscow was fixated on its war in Chechnya, Georgia began to
resist Russia's pull and turned westward. The frustrations with corruption in its own
government and with Russia's demeaning policies boiled over in 2003' s Rose Revolution, the inspiration for Ukraine's Orange Revolution. This popular protest, which
demanded better democratic institutions and a new leadership, began as massive
demonstrations and ended in the election of a new pro-Western government. Under
the new leadership of President Mikheil Saakashvili and with a popular mandate,
Georgia began to enact reforms that would qualify it for membership in both the EU
and NATO (Gahton 2010, 125-31).
Russia feared Georgia would join the ranks of formerly subordinate Baltic States
that had joined the security umbrella of NATO and began to actively prepare for war
against Georgia (Cornell and Starr 54-5). Moscow replaced South Ossetia' s leaders with
more aggressive and pro-Russia officials and ratcheted the level of military aid well
above Georgia's own capabilities. Between sabotaging the power grid and boycotting Georgian wine and other products, Russia continuously attempted to discipline
Georgia. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared in April 2008 that Russia "would
do its utmost not to allow Georgia and Ukraine into NATO'' (Cornell and Starr 127).
Ultimately, Russia's trump card was the breakaway regions. As in Moldova,
Georgia's eligibility for the EU and NATO hinged on these issues. In April 2008,
Angela Merkel stated that countries with unresolved territorial questions would
be unable to join NATO (Cornell and Starr 126). As long as Russia could prevent a
permanent resolution to Georgia's sovereignty, it would dominate the entire Caucasus region. Thus, Georgia and Russia's 2005 agreement that Russia would vacate its
Georgian bases by the end of 2008 threatened the security status quo and gave Tbilisi
an advantage in regaining control of the separatist regions (Oliker et al., 101--02). To
prevent the possible reunification of Georgia and possible entrance into European
institutions, Russia intended to decimate Georgia's capacity to retake sovereignty in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, thereby ensuring their place in international limbo.
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Following years of training separatist forces and constructing an adequate invasion infrastructure, Russia began the war slowly in June 2008 with the downing of
drones. With large-scale military maneuvers on the northern border throughout the
summer, Russia signaled its readiness to attack. Finally, on the seventh of August,
Russian battalions crossed the border and poured into South Ossetia. Recognizing the
commencement of war, Toilisi ordered Georgia's armies to enter and occupy South
Ossetia. Despite initial Georgian resistance, the invaders were too many and too well
equipped. Russian forces occupied most of the country by the time of the cease-fire on
the twelfth of August (Cornell and Starr 168-80; Gahrton 176-80).
Russia was successful in its main objective to punish Georgia in three ways. First,
Russia degraded Georgia's security sovereignty and made it unable to resist Russian intervention. Following the cease-fire, Russia acted with impunity as peacekeepers. Russia dismantled as much of Georgia's military apparatus as possible, carrying
away large amounts of Western technology in the process. Without munitions and
materiel, Georgia was far less equipped to resist future Russian intervention to say
nothing of intervention in the breakaway provinces (Gahrton 179-83; Cornell and
Starr 177).
Second, Russia diminished the international credibility of the Georgian regime
through an information war that was as aggressive as the ground offensive (Cornell
and Starr 181-82). In preparation for its offensive, Russia brought at least fifty Russian
journalists to the front, just days before the commencement of hostilities (183--84).
These journalists presented a unified message of unprovoked Georgian aggression
and ethnic cleansing against autonomous South Ossetia as the impetus for Russian
intervention. Simultaneously, Russia limited Georgia's ability to provide a competing narrative both by beginning the assault unannounced and by destroying cable
and telephone lines with the West (186). Initially much of Western media, relying on
Russian reports, found fault with Saakashvili as an overreaching despot trying to
reclaim territory by violence. This portrayal damaged much of the credibility Georgia
and Saakashvili had gained in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution (Gahrton 151). In
the months following the invasion, Russian accusations of genocide were debunked,
though ambiguity remained over which army entered South Ossetia first (a widely
read 2009 EU report assigned blame to Georgia). Despite continued Western support,
Georgia was no longer considered the beacon of freedom it had been just three years
earlier, due to lingering doubts among some about Georgia's actions before and during the war (Gahrton 190). Thus, Russia facilitated damage to Georgia's international
reputation among European organizations while simultaneously damaging its own
(Cornell and Starr 181-95).
This loss in military capability and international prestige contributed to the
Russian objective of preventing Georgia from replacing Russia as its dominant
partner. As Russian military analysist Pavel Felgenhauer noted, "The main task of
the Russian invasion was to bring about state failure and fully destroy the Geor12
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gian army and centralized police force. A failed Georgian state, tom apart by political rivalry and regional warlords, cannot ever become a NATO member and could
be easier to control from Moscow" (Cornell and Starr 177). Georgia was left in an
insecure and economically compromised state and became even less attractive for
immediate accession to EU and NATO membership. Publically, the U.S. and, to a
lesser degree, Europe promised military aid and future NATO accession; however,
without firm deadlines, Georgia's membership seems distant. James Sherr wrote that
as a result of the August War "Russia was far stronger in the region than it was in
2006. For the foreseeable future, NATO enlargement is dead in the water'' (Cornell
and Starr 215). Russia denied Georgia alternative partners for a hierarchal relationship for the near future.
In Georgia, Russia followed the familiar tactics in order to keep Georgia within a
hierarchal relationship. It used troops--both regular soldiers and peacekeepers--on
Georgia sovereign soil to maintain security sovereignty. Georgia attempted to leave
this arrangement by negotiating the closure of Russian bases and by applying for
NATO membership. To discipline its often-wayward subordinate, Russia used sanctions and sabotage, propaganda and planes, and intimidation and invasion. All these
actions had the effect of preventing Georgia from fulfilling its European inclinations
and reinforcing the ambiguous autonomous status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Ukraine
Having examined two cases of Russian discipline against its subordinates, the
war in Ukraine no longer appears surprising. Like other post-Soviet nations, Ukraine
is caught in a crisis of identity. Suspended between the West and East, Ukraine has
swung between its dual European and Eurasian identities (Plokhy 2008; Velychenko
2007). Only in the past year has this search for Ukraine's future turned violent, and
the violence refuses to be quenched by cease-fire agreements and promises. The rebels gained ground, Ukraine teetered on economic collapse, and the casualty count
grew (CSIS 2015). As opposed to the other cases, the ongoing nature of the war prevents establishing a complete picture. It may not be clear for years (if ever), the extent
to which Russia has financed and instigated this war. However, what is clear is that
Russia has been instrumental in organizing and maintaining the separatists, all while
using familiar tactics and justifications for familiar reasons. There is doubt that the
eventual fallout-breakaway states and lingering questions of sovereignty-will also
be familiar.
Ukraine's identity is linked tighter to Russia than either Georgia or Moldova.
Ukrainians are often referred to in Soviet and Russian media as little Russians, and
Russian plays a major linguistic and cultural role in Ukraine (Velychenko 1-5). Furthermore, Ukraine, after Russia, possesses the largest population and economy of the
nations of the former Soviet Union, while its position on the Black Sea and its border with Russia makes it strategically important for Moscow. Unlike other formerly
Soviet states, Ukraine experienced no serious ethnic conflicts following its indepen13
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dence in 1991. Instead, it remained a close ally of Russia, and the West paid it little
attention until the 2004 Orange Revolution (inspired by Georgia's similarly named
Rose Revolution) brought a pro-Western government into power (Allison 133). The
newly elected President Viktor Yushcheriko emphasized themes similar to political
and economic reform, similar to those espoused by Georgia's President Saakashvili
(134). These reformers preached the European identity of Ukraine and sought integration with the EU and NATO.
The Orange Revolution (and the strengthening of relationships with the West
that it represented) threatened Russia's special relationship with this subordinate. The
souring of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship was summarized in a release by the Russian Information and Press Department
Yet a radical new expansion of NATO may bring about a serious militarypolitical shift that will inevitably affect the security interests of Russia ...
Ukraine's likely integration into NATO will seriously complicate the manysided Russian-Ukrainian relations ... One has the impression that the present
Ukrainian leadership regards rapprochement with NATO largely as an alternative to good-neighborly ties with Russian Federation. (Kropatcheva 2010, 72)
Tensions increased between Moscow and Kiev culminating in the gas crisis of
2008--09. Russia, emboldened by a global economic crisis and its crushing victory in
that summer's war in Georgia, demanded that Ukraine pay massive price increases
in natural gas. Gazprom cut off gas supplies on 1 January 2009, when Yushchenko's
government refused to pay the new prices, beginning a major international crisis
(Kramer 2009). Ukraine suffered serious economic losses and Southern Europe was
deprived of gas until finally on the twentieth of January, Moscow and Kiev negotiated
a new contract. President Putin admitted that the gas crisis stemmed from the Orange
Revolution declaring that, ''This cannot be tolerated" (Kosienkowski and Schreiber
2012, 186). While unclear which side was primarily responsible for the crisis, the dispute clearly demonstrated Russia's economic of leverage over Ukraine.
The pro-Western movement suffered another tremendous blow when 2010
elections brought pro-Russia Yanukovych to power (besting the coalition beat that
of Yulia Tymoshenko, the prime minister of the former administration). Tymoshenko, who supported accession to both the NATO and EU while opposing the proposed Eurasia Union, was arrested and convicted of abusing public power in 2011
(Kramer 2011). By jailing the lead opposition voice (citing her signature of the 2009 deal
that ended the gas crisis) Yanukovych revealed his authoritarian leanings and proRussia stance (Economist 2012). The pro-West opposition frustrations boiled-over
in 2013, when Yanukovych scuttled negotiations for a long anticipated Association
Agreement with the EU, opting instead for a massive aid deal with Russia. The
prosecution of Tymoshenko sparked massive protests, and the rejection of the Association Agreement intensified protester resolve to remove Yanukovych from office
(CSIS 2015).
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Escalation on both sides led to dramatic violence in Kiev forcing Yanukovych to
flee the country in late February. The opposition's euphoria over his impeachment
was short-lived, as rumors of a renewed autonomy movement in Crimea surfaced in
early March. Mysterious militants with no identifying insignia took control of major
strategic points across the peninsula. By the end of March, Crimea's parliament staged
a referendum in which 97 percent of population supported annexation by Russia;
shortly thereafter, masked Russian soldiers completely took control of the peninsula
(Yurchak 2014). The conflict spread in early April to the western Russian-speaking
provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. Supplied with Russian arms and Russian soldiers, separatists claimed autonomy for their regions and pushed government troops
eastward. Meanwhile, massive Russian military exercises brought tens of thousands
of soldiers to Ukraine's western border. This aggressive action conjured memories of
the 2008 war in Georgia, and the Ukrainian government feared an imminent invasion. The perils of Russian-armed rebels was driven home by the seventeenth of
July downing of a civilian airliner by separatists using Russian anti-aircraft missiles.
Despite international outrage, thousands of Russian soldiers entered Donetsk to prevent a successful government counteroffensive in the late summer (CSIS 2015).
Partly due to the international furor and increasingly punitive sanctions from the
EU and U.S., Russia withdrew its soldiers; in September a ceasefire agreement was
signed in Minsk. The first Minsk agreement tenuously held for two months and failed
to prevent hundreds of deaths. In October, the rebels resumed the violence and were
successful in pushing the Kiev government back further. The second Minsk agreement in February 2015 proved more successful in staunching the violence. While the
fighting had subsided-though it had not stopped at the time of this writing-the international situation of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea remained unresolved. Russia has
shown no inclination to withdraw from Crimea or cease its support of Donetsk or
Luhansk. Instead, these provinces appear to be destined for the same limbo as Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia (CSIS 2015).
While an $18 million IMF loan and EU and U.S. sanctions against Russian illustrate Western solidarity with Ukraine, Russia has frustrated Ukrainian aspirations to
join Western organizations (CSIS 2015). The member states of NATO and the EU are
not willing to risk war by letting a country in deep financial struggles and a compromised security apparatus join their ranks. Russia on the other hand, has proven it is
willing to risk its international reputation, endure severe sanctions, and go to war in
order to maintain Ukraine as a buffer state. By creating an unstable situation of questioned sovereignty in Ukraine, Russia has condemned it to the same status as Georgia
and Moldova-an outsider, looking in on the EU.
Ukraine and Russia once enjoyed a special relationship. As recently as December 2013, Russia extended massive amounts of credit and gas discounts (CSIS 2015).
When large portions of the country rejected this hierarchal relationship in favor of
another, Russia began to discipline, first by annexing Crimea, then by creating linger15
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ing instability. Given Ukraine's unwillingness to respond to the discipline and cave
to Russian demands, Moscow may have ensured that Ukraine will never be willing to
return to its former status. As long as the government in Kiev does not fully control its
own territory, Ukraine's sovereignty will be in question, and it will be unable to fully
realize its dreams of membership in the EU and NATO (Economist 2015).

Conclusion
This paper seeks to answer whether the hierarchy theory can adequately explain
war-marred relationships between Russia and other former Soviet Republics. While
the fog of war obscures each case, Russia's relationships and wars appear to fit the
descriptions of hierarchy and discipline, respectively. In each of the three countries,
Russia maintained soldiers prior to the conflicts, signifying some amount of control
over security sovereignty. Furthermore, Russia owned large portions of capital and,
therefore, had an economic interest in each nation. Also, Russia exercised a high
amount of political influence in domestic politics by encouraging, supporting, and
funding pro-Russian candidates while discouraging pro-Western politicians, occasionally resorting to assassination. In each of the cases, Russia maintained a dominant
relationship before war.
Each of the wars was preceded by deviation of the subordinate state from the
hierarchal relationship. Moldovan politicians spoke of reunification with Romania,
Georgians strove for NATO membership, and Ukraine struggled with its identity
before deciding to attempt unification Europe rather than Eurasia. Russia's military
maneuvers were intended to prevent the realization of these intentions by creating
a permanent question of sovereignty, casting doubt on the economic and security
strength of the country, and by reducing the nation's liberal reputation among the
Western world. Furthermore, in each case, Russia used pre-existing ethnic and cultural divides to legitimize its involvement. Russia was so concerned about the perception of legitimacy that it engaged in an extensive media war in Georgia and disguised
its troops in Ukraine. Russia's concern for legitimate intervention is consistent with
the hierarchy theory's emphasis on authority.
Ultimately, Russia was successful in preventing the subordinate states from joining European organizations and apparatus. To this day, none of the nations discussed
have achieved their goals of full European integration. Given the greater Euro crisis
and the rise of anti-EU parties in many of the member nations, the era of EU expansion may have come to a close (Economist 2013 ). Of course, Russia has suffered consequences as its wars delegitimize its foreign policy to its subordinate states and make
it a near pariah in the world's eye. Whether such actions have negatively affected
Russia's sphere of influence has yet to be seen. It is important to note that Moldova
remained an ally of Moscow for more than a decade following the war in Transnistria.
As long as Russia holds to the goal of maintaining its sphere of influence, it is
likely that its aggressive and belligerent behavior will continue. Moscow has demonstrated its resolve in the face of enormous international pressure to discipline its
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subordinates and prevent them from defecting. However, in the long run, the Western
carrot will triumph over the Russian stick. The counterexample of the Baltic States,
demonstrates that integration of post-Soviet nations can be successfully achieved without violence but only if Europe seeks strong economic and cultural ties and scrutinizes
Russian relations to prevent violence (Kolsto 2002). Ultimately, the economic and political opportunities represented by the European Union will be more attractive than the
current Russian alternative. Therefore, even with her hand on the gas spigot and her
armies ever prepared, authoritarian Russia will be unable to maintain its relationships,
because it lacks the legitimacy of democratic Europe. How does one state maintain their
hierarchal relationships? It seems the EU understands that better than Russia.
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